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‘PARLIAMENTARISATION’ OF THE CFSP: WISHFUL 
THINKING OR A RATIONAL CHOICE?
Oleksandr Moskalenko*
Summary: The paper provides an insight into the institutional system of 
EU external relations, focusing on the role of the European Parliament. 
It argues that the current intergovernmental set-up of the CFSP is one of 
the major reasons for EU international under-performance. Against this 
background, the paper discusses the potential benefits of the ‘parlimen-
tarisation’ of this policy area, implying deeper Parliamentary involve-
ment in the entire policy cycle (preparation, formation, supervision). 
The paper argues that the parliamentarisation of the CFSP would pro-
vide a practical and comprehensive solution to a number of diverse 
problems that the EU has encountered recently. Besides reinforcement 
of the EU foundations by connecting the CFSP with a grand theory of 
democratic legitimacy, this process would enhance the transparency, 
coherence and effectiveness of the policy formation process as well 
as the accountability of the EU executives involved in this policy area.
1 Introduction
Relations between international organisations and parliaments have 
never been simple.1 In this sense, the European Union (EU) is no dif-
ferent. But if a political system works successfully and effectively these 
relations are not usually at the top of the agenda. However, the post-Lis-
bon EU foreign policy can hardly be called a success, with the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) being an example of rather the opposite. The 
political turbulence and further radicalisation in Northern Africa in the 
aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ as well as the armed conflicts in Ukraine 
and Syria morphed the EU neighbourhood into something entirely dif-
ferent from the ENP’s initial goal of prosperous neighbours sharing the 
common values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
Certainly, it was a combination of flaws that led to the frustrating 
result, requiring a closer look at all the components of the EU’s exter-
nal relations. From this perspective, the institutional framework must 
be no exception, especially in the context of it being a major target for 
the Lisbon transformations aimed at ensuring that Europe ‘speaks with 
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one voice’ in its international relations. This paper provides an insight 
into the institutional system of the EU external relations. It focuses on 
the current institutional role of the European Parliament (EP) within the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in the wider context of 
EU foreign policy. The article argues that the current intergovernmental 
set-up of the CFSP constrains both the formation and the implementa-
tion of EU foreign policy. In this context, the article discusses the poten-
tial benefits of ‘parlimentarisation’ of this policy area, by which is meant 
the EP’s involvement in the entire policy cycle, including the preparation 
and formation of the CFSP as well as supervision of its implementation. 
The paper argues that the parliamentarisation of the CFSP provides 
a practical and comprehensive option, which would facilitate progress of 
this policy area. In addition to considerably reinforcing the EU’s founda-
tions by embedding the CFSP into the wider context of the democratic 
legitimacy concept, parliamentarisation will enhance the transparency, 
coherence and effectiveness of the policy formation process as well as 
the accountability of the EU executives in this policy area. Its potential 
in terms of facilitating the formation of a genuinely common European 
policy based on the values declared by the Lisbon Treaty should also be 
stressed.
The paper consists of seven sections, including this introduction and 
a conclusion. Section 2 provides the background to the research with an 
analysis of specific features of EU foreign policy as well as the current 
legal framework of the EP’s involvement in EU external relations. Section 
3 studies the existing problems of the CFSP, which are mostly associated 
with the intergovernmental mode of its formation. Section 4 scrutinises 
the theoretical reasoning for the deeper involvement of the EP in the poli-
cy formation process, concentrating on the arguments of ‘democratic def-
icit’ and ‘democratic legitimacy’ whilst further elaborating this reasoning 
within the unique EU political environment. Section 5 moves from theory 
to practical challenges and analyses the potential that parliamentarisa-
tion possesses in terms of meeting them. Section 6 concentrates on the 
final stage of the policy cycle, providing a study of the potential benefits of 
an enhanced role for the EP in control over policy implementation, which 
includes the EP’s relations with the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘HR’), the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and the heads of EU delegations. 
2 An asymmetric policy area and split competences.
This section provides the background of the study by examining spe-
cific features of the EU as an international actor and the legal framework 
of the EP’s involvement in its foreign policies. The overwhelming domi-
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nance of non-military tools is a paramount fact that shapes the entire 
structure of the EU’s external relations. Despite previously raised hopes 
for a defence union,2 which were reasserted by the Lisbon Treaty,3 the 
formation of a common EU military force is currently more a political is-
sue than a practical process, which reaffirms the ironic definition of the 
EU as ‘economic giant, political gnome and military worm’.4 Thus, the 
concept of normative power supported by economic means of influence 
remains the major relevant explanatory model for the EU’s impact on 
international politics. The first post-Lisbon HR Baroness Ashton stated 
that the EU ‘cannot deploy gunboats or bombers’; instead, she stressed 
that the strength of the EU ‘lies, paradoxically, in its inability to throw its 
weight around’.5 Indeed, that strength resides in trade, aid and develop-
ment assistance, which have traditionally been at the core of the EU’s 
ability to exert its influence and promote its values beyond the territory 
of its Member States.6 Therefore, instead of remaining an isolated policy, 
the CFSP should increasingly function as a policy that generates ‘nexus 
decisions’, which would underlie and consolidate other aspects of EU ex-
ternal relations.7 In this case, it will facilitate the development of synergy 
within EU foreign policy.
The Lisbon Treaty considerably enhanced the EP’s position in most 
policies, yet not the CFSP. The new formula, which connected the con-
sent right with the ordinary legislative procedure,8 covers 87 different 
policy areas.9 In this sense, trade, aid and development policies fall with-
in the above-mentioned pattern of the strengthened EP role. Trade as 
the essential part of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) falls within 
exclusive EU competence,10 while aid and development policies represent 
a specific case of competence division, with the Union having competence 
to conduct a common policy, although without preventing Member States 
2 S Stavridis, ‘Why the “Militarising” of the European Union Is Strengthening the Concept 
of a “Civilian Power Europe”’ (2001) European University Institute Working Paper 17.
3 Art 42 TEU.
4 A Plecko, ‘Die Nato ist die Eintrittskarte in die EU’ Wall Street Journal (28 September 
2014) <www.wsj.de/nachrichten/SB10349853011903034570704580177690824385742?
mg=reno64-wsjde> accessed 30 December 2016.  
5 Speech of Baroness Ashton (Corvinus University, Budapest, 25 February 2011) <http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/126> accessed 30 De-
cember 2016.
6 D Mix, ‘The European Union Foreign and Security Policy’ (2013) Congress Research Ser-
vice 7-5700, 20 <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41959.pdf> accessed 30 December 2016. 
7 Wouters and Raube (n 1) 9.
8 Art 218 TFEU.
9 T Tiilikainen, ‘The Empowered European Parliament: Accommodation to the New Func-
tions Provided by the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
(FIIA) Briefing Paper 91, 4.
10 Art 3 TFEU.
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from exercising theirs.11 In the practical sense, all those policies are legis-
lated in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.12 It should be 
stressed that the EP’s role in these policies is not limited to its functions 
within the ordinary legislative procedure. For the CCP, the EP has be-
come one of the key actors.13 Regarding assistance to third countries, the 
EP co-decides with the Council not only on the development cooperation 
instrument, but also on the financing aspects of all other instruments,14 
thus enjoying an equal footing with the Council in terms of formal policy-
making competences.15 
In terms of international agreements within these policies, the pro-
cedure requires the EP’s consent for all three cases.16 In the wider con-
text, article 218 TFEU and the framework agreement of 201017 confirmed 
a number of the EP’s important rights, emphasising the general princi-
ple of equal treatment with the Council.18 These privileges, solidly based 
on the consent right and accompanied by its traditional agenda for for-
eign policies, made the EP an independent and powerful player in EU 
external relations.19 Moreover, the EP managed to use the post-Lisbon 
institutional uncertainty to successfully reinterpret its right to be ‘in-
formed’ in international negotiations, and transformed it into a right to be 
‘involved’,20 by providing ex-ante control as well.21 This raised its status 
to a position capable of steering the negotiators’ agenda and controlling 
the negotiation process.22 In this way, the EP’s resolutions play a two-
fold role: they indicate to the target country the EP’s priorities and at the 
11 Art 4 (4) TFEU.
12 Arts 207, 209, 212-214 TFEU.
13 Tiilikainen (n 9) 7.
14 In particular: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance; Instrument for European Neigh-
bourhood Policy Initiative; Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace; Partnership In-
strument; and European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.
15 P Bajtay, ‘Shaping and Controlling Foreign Policy: Parliamentary Diplomacy and Over-
sight, and the Role of the European Parliament’ (European Parliament, Think Tank 2015) 
27 <www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/search.html?authors=25360> accessed 30 
December 2016.
16 Art 218 (6 a (v)) TFEU.
17 Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission [2010] OJ L304/47.
18 ibid, point 9.
19 R Passos, ‘The European Union’s External Relations a Year after Lisbon: A First Evalu-
ation from the European Parliament’ in P Koutrakos (ed), The European Union’s External 
Relations a Year after Lisbon (CLEER working paper No 3, 2011) 51.
20 Ariadna Ripoll Servent, ‘The Role of the European Parliament in International Negotia-
tions after Lisbon’ (2014) 21(4) Journal of European Public Policy 568, 580.
21 Lucia Serena Rossi ‘A New Inter-Institutional Balance: Supranational vs Intergovern-
mental Method after the Lisbon Treaty’ in The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: Vi-
sions of Leading Policy-Makers, Academics and Journalists (European Union, Directorate-
General for Education and Culture 2011) 102.
22 Servent (n 20) 580.
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same time they are a means for the inter-institutional communication, 
thus providing ‘a second mandate’ for the Council and Commission.23 
The academic literature provides a number of practical illustrations of 
this phenomenon.24 In particular, the case of the EU-South Korea Free 
Trade Agreement negotiations emphasised a new status of the EP as an 
‘emerging principal’ in Principal-Agent relations with the Commission.25 
Furthermore, this precedent-setting case revealed the growing potential 
of the EP ‘to flex its muscles’ in pushing the Commission for a number of 
important concessions in terms of both the essence of the treaty and the 
enhanced role of the EP during the negotiation procedure.26
In the de facto preserved ‘second pillar’ of the CFSP, which continues 
to be based on special rules,27 the EP’s competences are much narrower. 
A number of informational rights are secured by article 36 TEU; however, 
the EP is formally excluded from the conclusion of international agree-
ments28 as well as from the policy formation process. Those competences 
belong to the European Council and the Council, which shape the poli-
cies and adopt decisions as for the operational actions.29 Although the 
EP is to be informed of all European Council decisions,30 this right does 
not let it into the policy formation process, as the Council does not have 
any formal obligations should the EP adopt any document in this regard. 
All obligations towards the EP lie with the HR, who is formally obliged 
‘to ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into 
consideration’.31 However, his/her major responsibility is to put the CFSP 
into effect.32 The practical aspects of the implementation of article 36 
TEU are regulated by the Inter-Institutional Agreement of 2013, which 
established a specific format of regular political dialogue on the CFSP 
and quarterly reports on its implementation.33 Nonetheless, with the EP 
23 Passos (19) 55.
24 S Stavridis and D Irrera (eds), The European Parliament and its International Relations 
(Routledge 2015).
25 M Elsig and C Dupont, ‘European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, 
Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements’ (2012) 50(3) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 492, 502.
26 ibid 498-502.
27 W Wessels and F Bopp, ‘The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty: 
Constitutional Breakthrough or Challenges Ahead?’ (2008) CEPS Challenge Research Paper 
No 10, 2 <http://aei.pitt.edu/9403/> accessed 30 December 2016.
28 Art 218 (6) TFEU.
29 Art 22 (1), 26, 28 (1), 29 TEU.
30 Art 15 (6 d) TEU.
31 Art 36 TEU.
32 Art 22 (1) TEU.
33 Section E of Part II of the Inter-institutional Agreement of 2 December 2013 between the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on coop-
eration in budgetary matters and on sound financial management [2013] OJ C373/01.
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remaining formally excluded from the CFSP formation process as well 
as from the adoption of instruments,34 it is often called an ‘ex post facto 
information receiver’.35 
The remaining split in EU foreign policy is illogical from the perspec-
tive of the interconnection between the CFSP and other areas of foreign 
policy mentioned above, as well as the blurred borderlines between them. 
Further, any form of external action can be brought within the term ‘for-
eign and security policy’, which develops into the problem of overlapping 
competences.36 Against this background, the asymmetry of the EP’s com-
petences is developing into a separate institutional problem. The practi-
cal example of the EU’s ‘targeted sanctions’37 emphasised that the differ-
ence in procedures between the CFSP and other policy areas, as well as 
the difference in the EP’s role in these procedures, increases the potential 
for inter-institutional conflicts as the boundaries between the CFSP and 
other aspects of EU foreign policy are blurred.38 In the case referred to 
above, the margin between the CFSP and the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) was rather vague. Thus, the EP used the opportunity 
and contested the choice of the legal basis for the documents in question, 
arguing in favour of article 75 TFEU since it provided for the application 
of the ordinary legislative procedure instead of the mere informing of the 
EP by the Council as foreseen by the other option.39 
In a wider context, the split in the EP’s external competences re-
mains one of the reasons that the EU is often referred to as ‘punching 
below its global weight’40 in its relations with third countries, which im-
plies a significant space for improvement in this policy area. Below, this 
paper deals with a number of institutional reasons for this phenomenon. 
Further, the paper also studies the benefits of CFSP parliamentarisation, 
reaffirming the general argument here concerning the potential of this 
process for reinforcing the EU’s international performance.
 
34 Art 25 TEU.
35 S Stavridis, ‘The CFSP/ESDP, Parliamentary Accountability, and the “Future of Europe” 
Convention Debate’ (2003) Working Paper No 42, 3.
36 J Schmidt, ‘The High Representative, the President and the Commission—Competing 
Players in the EU’s External Relations: The Case of Crisis Management’ in PJ Cardwell (ed), 
EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era (TMC Asser Press 2012) 173-
175.
37 D Cortright and others, ‘Targeted Financial Sanctions: Smart Sanctions That Do Work’ 
in D Cortright and G Lopez (eds), Smart Sanctions. Targeting Economic Statecraft (Rowman 
and Littlefield 2002).
38 P van Elsuwege, ‘The Adoption of “Targeted Sanctions” and the Potential for Inter-insti-
tutional Litigation after Lisbon’ (2011) 7(4) Journal of Contemporary European Research.
39 Art 215 (2) TFEU.
40 Mix (n 6) 2.
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3 What is the problem? 
This section studies the structural flaws of the CFSP formation pro-
cess, arguing that the existing framework undermines the development 
of EU foreign policy. For decades, EU foreign policy has been associated 
with ‘a lack of leadership, continuity, consistency and diplomatic resourc-
es’.41 One of the major goals of the Lisbon reforms was to rectify those 
defects. However, the post-Lisbon CFSP ‘intergovernmental construction’ 
is still associated with a lack of strategic coherence and a lack of ‘a spirit 
of unity, coherence and efficiency’, subsequently leading to weak inter-
national EU actorness.42 Supporting this claim, the paper submits that 
the intergovernmental policy formation mode prevents the formation of a 
consistent and coherent European foreign policy. Defining the intergov-
ernmental mode, the article refers to a combination of features, includ-
ing the national veto right, the dominance of national executives and the 
formal exclusion of the EP from the process. 
The Member States’ veto right43 is one of the important features that 
determines the entire framework of the CFSP. Certainly, it is one of the 
major reasons for the national-based policy formation mode, which, how-
ever, meets the intention of the Member States (particularly the large and 
powerful ones) of having their own agendas for foreign policy. They have 
little intention of letting the HR assume an automatic lead on policy is-
sues, particularly sensitive ones, thus preventing him/her from creating 
his/her own political direction, especially if it is proactive and robust.44 
Therefore, EU foreign policy is often associated with the leaders of the 
EU’s largest countries: Germany, France and the UK. An illustration of 
this argument is the rather dubious situation of Egypt in the aftermath of 
the ‘Arab spring’ when the new Egyptian government declared that they 
were ‘too busy’ to receive the HR;45 however, about two weeks later they 
welcomed the UK Prime Minister.46 
41 J Paul, ‘EU Foreign Policy after Lisbon. Will the New High Representative and the Ex-
ternal Action Service Make a Difference?’ (2008) Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) 
Policy Analysis No 2, 8 <http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/785/pdf/CAP_Policy_
Analysis_2008_02.pdf> accessed 30 December 2016.
42 L Corduneanu, ‘CFSP – Vacillating Between Supranationalism and Intergovernmental-
ism?’ (2014) CES Working Papers 6(1), 58  <http://journals.indexcopernicus.com/issue.
php?id=9384&id_issue=873835>  accessed 30 December 2016.
43 Art 31 (1) TEU.
44 J Howorth, ‘Catherine Ashton’s Five-Year Term: A Difficult Assessment’ (2014) 3 Les 
Cahiers européens de Sciences 20 <www.cee.sciences-po.fr/en/publications/les-cahiers-
europeens/2014/doc/1142/raw> accessed 30 December 2016.
45 ‘Don’t Visit Us for the Moment, Egypt Tells EU’s Ashton’ M&G News (February 2011).
46 N Gros-Verheyde, ‘La “course du Caire”, nouveau jeu européen. Ou comment griller la 
politesse à Lady Ashton’ Bruxelles 2 (21 February 2011). 
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Thus, the current national-based mode of CFSP formation, built 
around the national veto right, constitutes ‘a principal obstacle to a more 
proactive EU foreign policy’47 for at least two reasons. First of all, it may 
prevent the development of any policy at all,48 which is quite often the 
case. Moreover, instead of developing a genuinely all-European policy, 
this mode implies the coordination and unification of policies generated 
in national capitals, with the HR being burdened with this duty. So, she/
he is forced to play the role of mediator shuttling between the capitals 
and negotiating compromises, being ‘caught somewhere between a re-
sponsibility to coordinate and a responsibility to exercise some measure 
of leadership’.49 However, the nature of such a coordination process is 
certainly different from genuine policy formation. In many ways it is simi-
lar to consensus-building, which is dealt with below. Furthermore, the 
absence of strategic policies can hardly be compensated for by any reac-
tive actions, which is especially true for rapidly developing crises. 
For practical illustration of the last point, one needs look no further 
than the crises in the EU neighbourhood. During the Arab Spring, the 
critical need for the HR to obtain unanimous and full backing from the 
Member States for her actions50 and their inability to promptly come to 
common accords made the EU look rather helpless against the rapidly de-
teriorating situation. A rather similar situation developed in Ukraine after 
the outrage of the ‘Revolution of Dignity’.51 The HR’s visits to Kiev were 
not well coordinated with either the work being done by the Commission 
or with the parallel visit of the EU troika of Laurent Fabius, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier and Radek Sikorski.52 Thus, it was the cacophony emanating 
from Europe that led the US Under-Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland, 
to utter her famous leaked expletive.53 
The second reason is the fact that the national-based policy for-
mation mode facilitates the fragmentation of EU foreign policies. In the 
absence of any common policy, the Member States certainly have an al-
ternative modus operandi, as they are capable of both independent ac-
tion and action within a group. These options not only create additional 
pressure on the policy formation process, but also marginalise the CFSP 
to extraordinary cases of common threats, thus making this policy the 
‘last resort’ option against the divergence of national perspectives and 
priorities, with the Iraq war of 2003 and the Kosovo case being well-
47 Paul (n 41) 30.
48 Mix (n 6) 2.
49 Howorth (n 44) 20.
50 D Hannay, ‘Benchmarking the EU’s New Diplomatic Service’ (Europe’s World, 21 Janu-
ary 2011). 
51 December 2013 to February 2014. 
52 Howorth (n 44) 19.
53 ibid.
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known illustrations.54 Furthermore, the current mode of policy formation 
‘almost inevitably’ leads to the lack of ‘strategic thrust or “heroic” objec-
tives’.55 The diversity of national political interests varies so greatly that 
a consensus often requires extraordinary efforts. Moreover, consensus is 
a matter of degree, ‘varying in depth from an agreement on general policy 
parameters and objectives down to specific policy details’.56 Against this 
background, the logic of consensus-building implies the lowest common 
policy denominators, as they are easiest to reach within a limited time-
frame. However, this reality suggests two consequences. The first is the 
constant coordination process, and the second is the ‘thorny path’ from 
one ‘lowest common policy denominator’ to another. Both consequences 
are incompatible with the development of long-term strategies. Neither 
can consistency of common policy be reasonably expected under the cir-
cumstances. Ultimately, the process of constant compromises, coordina-
tion, matching and concords between 28 different positions raises such 
basic questions as what the policy actually is and who developed it. 
4 Why the European Parliament? 
This section focuses on providing the theoretical reasoning behind 
the idea of CFSP parliamentarisation. It briefly summarises the major ar-
guments in the academic debate and further elaborates them within the 
specific political environment of the EU. In this sense, the limited partici-
pation of national legislatures in the foreign policy of the Member States 
is a ‘false friend’ for comparison, as the EU ‘no-state’ status leads to a 
number of tricky consequences which cannot be ignored without missing 
the devil in the details. But first, the theory.
Democracy and legitimacy: these two concepts cover most of the 
theoretical arguments for parliaments to participate in making public 
policies and creating compulsory rules.57 From Ancient Greece to con-
temporary post-modern societies, these concepts continue to shape the 
architecture of power. It is no surprise that the EP has often utilised this 
type of argument for its ‘egoistic’ institutional purposes of appealing for 
more competences. Although this argumentation has been referred to as 
‘democratic blackmailing’,58 it still remains valid as it appeals to the basic 
54 Mix (n 6) 8.
55 J Howorth and A Menon, ‘Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Bal-
ancing the United States’ (2009) 53(5) Journal of Conflict Resolution 727.
56 Mix (n 6) 9.
57 J Mittag and W Wessels, ‘The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/ESDP. Options for the 
European Convention’ (2002) Study submitted for the European Parliament Directorate-
General for Research under Contract No IV/2002/01/01 Final report, 18.
58 D Thym, ‘Beyond Parliament’s Reach? The Role of the European Parliament in the CFSP’ 
(2006) 11(1) European Foreign Affairs Review109, 115-117.
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concepts at the core of ‘Western civilization’ as a philosophical category. 
Contained in the works of Enlightenment philosophers such as Hobbs, 
Montesquieu, and Locke, as well as the US Founding Fathers,59 these con-
cepts initiated the modern type of state, and still remain its cornerstone. 
The same theoretical tradition was continued by the social philosophers 
of the post-modern era, with J Habermas being one of the most famous 
and most consistent promoters of the idea that it is democracy which 
lies at the core of legitimacy.60 Although they have developed throughout 
recent centuries due to the evolution of Western societies, the concepts 
of democracy and legitimacy have preserved their clear and simple logics, 
as well as their close interconnection: ‘in liberal democracies there can be 
no legitimacy without democracy and there can be no democracy without 
representation’.61 J Rawls echoes this understanding, referring to the ex-
ceptional role of these concepts and stressing that democratic legitimacy 
is the only form of legitimacy available to liberal societies.62
For decades the concepts of democracy and legitimacy have been at 
the core of the European discourse.63 The debate has had two separate 
focuses on what are termed ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy. Defining their 
difference, C Sharman stressed that both forms express public assess-
ment of the worth of an institution; however, ‘input legitimacy is a matter 
of the design of the institution while output legitimacy must be earned 
by the institution’s performance’.64 It was the extensive post-Maastricht 
‘democratic deficit’ debate65 that transferred the issue of EU democratisa-
tion into one of the priorities for the Lisbon reforms. The ‘input legitimacy’ 
debate made the EP one of its major focuses as it was considered to be 
a source of legitimacy for the EU institutional system.66 Furthermore, 
the EP was considered to be the key EU institution that would lead to a 
new democratic quality for the Union, thus turning the entire EU system 
59 A Hamilton, J Madison and J Jay, The Federalist Papers (Palgrave Macmillan 1961).
60 J Habermas,  ‘Die Postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie’ in J 
Habermas (ed), Die Postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays (Suhrkamp Verlag 1998). 
61 C Lord, ‘The Political Theory and Practice of Parliamentary Participation in the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (2011) 18(8) Journal of European Public Policy 1133, 1147.
62 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1993) 38.
63 T Banchoff and M Smith, ‘Introduction: Conceptualizing Legitimacy in a Contested Pol-
ity’ in T Banchoff and M Smith (eds), Legitimacy and the European Union (Routledge 1999); 
and A Moravcsik, ‘Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union’ (2002) 4 Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies 603. 
64 C Sharman, ‘Political Legitimacy for an Appointed Senate’ (2008) 14(11) IRPP Choices 2, 
6-7.
65 See for example, Frank Decker, ‘Governance beyond the Nation State. Reflections on the 
Democratic Deficit of the European Union (2002) 9(2) Journal of European Public Policy 
256; Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The Question of Standards’ 
(1998) 4(1) European Law Journal 5.
66 C Strøby-Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’ in M Cini and N Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, Euro-
pean Union Politics (OUP 2010) 75-77. 
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into an ‘ordinary’ democratic system.67 These ideas underlie the Lisbon 
parlimentarisation of the EU institutional system, thus reflecting the in-
terconnection between democratic legitimacy at the conceptual level and 
the increase in the EP’s institutional influence.68 
The general nature of these concepts is evident. N Lalone presents 
the argument that ‘democratic foundation’ reasoning would apply equally 
to the CFSP,69 as no specific public policy has an exceptional status, 
at least in theory. However, traditionally it has been foreign policy that 
enjoys special status as the realm of executives inter alia in terms of 
policy making.70 Nonetheless, this practice developed at the national level 
requires additional examination in terms of both reasoning and conse-
quences. Traditionally, references to secrecy and limited EP expertise 
have been major arguments against a greater role for the EP in the CFSP. 
Below, this section discusses each of these points.
The argument regarding the EP’s limited expertise71 can hardly be 
viewed as sufficient. First of all, the role that the EP is supposed to play 
in the policy formation process certainly differs from that of highly spe-
cialised executive technocrats. This role is to form a bridge from the area 
of specialised expertise to public debate with further reference to demo-
cratic legitimacy.72 In this sense, the experience that the EP has in public 
debate and political dialogue construction73 should be stressed separate-
ly. Furthermore, its experience in sensitive international situations74 as 
well as in the policy formation process would certainly be able to provide 
benefits to the CFSP as well. Another fact is that the EP has already been 
extensively involved in the EU foreign policy formation process. Although 
this was not the CFSP but adjoining areas of trade, aid and development, 
this fact already implies that the EP is no novice when it comes to EU 
external relations. The figures speak for themselves. In the course of the 
7th legislative term (2009–2014) the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs 
67 Mittag and Wessels (n 57) 12.
68 I Bache, S Bulmer and S George, Politics in the European Union (3rd edn, OUP 2011) 26-
27. 
69 N Lalone, ‘Accountability in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Lessons 
from the Common Commercial Policy’ in Anna Herranz and Esther Barbé (eds), The Role of 
Parliaments in European Foreign Policy: Debating on Accountability and Legitimacy (Oficina 
d’informació del Parlament Europeu 2005) 9.
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(AFET) adopted 104 reports, 46 own initiative reports and 99 opinions.75 
Moreover, AFET members are not only deeply involved in EU external 
relations, but also have access to the classified information necessary.76
Given the common understanding that foreign policy is a policy of a 
strategic nature, whereby choices of values and strategies are made with 
long-lasting implications,77 it appears paradoxical to deploy arguments 
of secrecy, confidentiality and flexibility against the EP’s participation.78 
At the current level of international relations, the phrase ‘secret strategy’ 
sounds like an oxymoron, reviving memories of the secret pacts of previ-
ous centuries, which divided the world into ‘spheres of influence’.79 Is it a 
pattern that the EU follows? Certainly not. Furthermore, there is growing 
discrepancy between the development of modern polities and the idea 
that strategic decisions can be made outside public debate. It is the his-
toric perspective that is emphasised by Lord, who connects the secrecy 
and flexibility arguments with two of Locke’s observations concerning the 
unpredictable nature of possible dangers and the appeal for a wider mar-
gin of freedom for the government to adequately meet these challenges.80 
However, he is rather sceptical about the validity of these arguments.81 
One should also stress the growing divergence between the secrecy 
argument and the contemporary requirements of democratic rule. Despite 
the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has not provided a clear formal solution in 
terms of ‘the tension between effective international security coordination 
and democratic accountability’,82 it nonetheless marked the next level of 
EU development with article 10 TEU,83 recognising it as a representative 
democracy, although some scholars emphasise its sui generis nature.84 
From this perspective, the principles of democratic rule are formulated as 
75 Bajtay (n 15) 3. 
76 Inter-institutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the Council con-
cerning the forwarding to and handling by the European Parliament of classified informa-
tion held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of 12 March 2014. 
77 Bajtay (n 15) 23, 39. 
78 J Böcker, Demokratiedefizit der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU? Analyse 
des deutschen, britischen und Europäischen Parlaments (Nomos 2012) 23 <www.nomos-
shop.de/14338> accessed 30 December 2016; D Peters, W Wagner and C Glahn, ‘Parlia-
mentary Control of Military Missions: The Case of the EU NAVFOR Atalanta’ (2011) RECON 
Online Working Paper 2011/24. 
79 USSR-Germany (Molotov-Ribbentrop) pact of 1939, for example.
80 Lord (n 61) 146.
81 ibid. 
82 W Wagner, Demokratische Kontrolle internationalisierter Sicherheitspolitik: Demokratie-
defizite bei Militäreinsätzen und in der europäischen Politik innerer Sicherheit (Nomos 2010) 
187.
83 Art 10 (1) TEU.
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a legal obligation of a higher level. Furthermore, the contemporary devel-
opment of post-modern societies has put greater pressure on politicians, 
who are expected to act within democratic arrangements.85 Thus, compli-
ance with minimal democratic standards86 has developed into a political 
imperative. It is especially true for the EU, with its vulnerable ‘no-state’ 
status, continuous legitimacy deficit debate and dependence on both Eu-
ropean public opinion and the policies of its Member States. 
From the experience of foreign policy formation at the national level, 
two observations must be noted. The first is the fact that policy is made 
by a strong political player, which is the government. Although the level 
of its internal cohesion may vary depending upon the principles of its 
formation in a particular country, it is still one government, which shares 
a certain level of internal unity, as well as a common political destiny 
as a government. For comparison, reference is often made to the USA 
and the UK, which also illustrate the claims that this paper submits. In 
both cases the governments play a central role in the countries’ political 
establishment, and they are strong players, possessing both influence 
and resources. The second observation is the existence of rather blurred 
borderlines between making foreign policy and implementing it, as the 
same people are involved at both levels. From this perspective, the refer-
ences to secrecy, efficiency and flexibility make sense as they refer to the 
implementation stage, which indeed requires them. 
In the discussion of the consequences for the EU of the special sta-
tus of foreign policy at the national level of Member States, three should 
be stressed separately. First of all, the limited parliamentary scrutiny 
over foreign policy at the level of the Member States has substantiated 
the ‘democracy deficit’ debate, developing it into the ‘double democracy 
deficit’ argument specifically for the CFSP.87 This argument implies that 
the involvement of the EP in this policy area is crucial from the perspec-
tive of the democratic legitimacy concept, as national parliaments do not 
fulfil this function. 
The second consequence is the fact that the executive policy-making 
mode, which is typical for the national level, is not appropriate for the 
EU due to the fact that the Council and/or the European Council differ 
from national governments inasmuch as they are far more amorphous 
institutions. In this context, the question becomes who actually makes 
the CFSP? In reality, the vast majority of the ‘spade work’ is done by 
85 U Krotz and R Maher, ‘International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign 
and Security Policy’ (2014) 63(3) World Politics 548, 573. 
86 J Bohman, ‘Democratising the Transnational Polity: The European Union and the Pre-
suppositions of Democracy’ in EO Eriksen (ed), How to Reconstitute Democracy in Europe? 
(Proceedings from the RECON Opening Conference, RECON Report No 3, ARENA 2007).
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auxiliary institutions.88 At the same time, the institutions, which are for-
mally entrusted with decision-making authorities,89 enjoy the format of 
‘typically a three-hour meeting followed by a two-hour lunch followed by 
three more hours of “deliberations”’.90 Thus, the entire process is often 
described as ‘rubber-stamping by politicians’,91 which causes a painful 
déjà vu feeling of the pre-Lisbon ‘democracy deficit’ debate. 
The reference to the HR in terms of the policy formation process is 
not appropriate. Despite the fact that she is relatively often associated 
with policy formation,92 in reality she lacks both the formal competences 
and resources to be a substantial part of it, as the practical cases above 
have demonstrated. However, these associations emphasise the third 
consequence, which is the need for a clearer distinction between policy 
formation and implementation levels, both formally and institutionally. 
Moreover, this distinction will allow a specification of debate in terms of 
the EP’s involvement at either level. 
Answering the question in the title of this section, I argue here that 
CFSP parliamentarisation provides a complex solution to most of the prob-
lems mentioned. First of all, this development will enhance the EU un-
stable sui generis status. Being such an entity implies a difference from 
a state with all its established attributes of sovereignty, including inter-
national actorness. Therefore, legitimacy develops into an issue of major 
importance.93 Furthermore, actions establishing both its own EU-level ob-
ligations and obligations for its Member States require a strong source of 
direct legitimacy, at least comparable with national legislatures. Thus, the 
EP hardly has any alternative. It is the only parliament at the EU level, it 
is directly elected by the Union’s citizens,94 it is the only institution able to 
ensure democratic control over other EU institutions as collective bodies, 
and its powers and practices are common to the Union as a whole.95  
Letting the EP play a notable role within the CFSP will undermine 
the ‘democracy deficit’ debate both in its general and specific ‘double 
deficit’ formats. However, this approach implies the EP’s involvement in 
the entire political cycle, which includes the preparation and formation 
88 J Howorth, ‘Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational 
Intergovernmentalism?’ (2011) KFG Working Paper Series, No 25, March 2011, 23 <www.
polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/index.html> ac-
cessed 30 December 2016.
89 ibid 7.
90 Arts 22(1), 26 TEU.
91 Howorth (n 88) 7.
92 Paul (n 41) 17. 
93 Mittag and Wessels (n 57) 11.
94 Art 14 TEU.
95 Lord (n 61) 1143.
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of the CFSP as well as supervision over policy implementation.96 My sec-
ond argument is that the EP’s participation will enhance the structure 
for the currently amorphous and tangled CFSP formation process, taking 
into consideration its huge experience of policy formation within other 
areas,97 as well as the importance of the institutionalised debate for the 
policy formation process. 
The third argument is the influence of parliamentarisation on both 
European public opinion and partner countries. In this sense, the EP’s 
role is diverse and multifaceted, ranging from provoking public resonance 
and mobilising public opinion98 to bridging between the CFSP and Euro-
pean public opinion in search of public support ‘and popular commit-
ment for the EU’s global engagement’.99 From a more specific perspective, 
it should be stressed that foreign policy is now under increasing pres-
sure for greater transparency from public opinion, which has become in-
creasingly aware of the impact that international politics has on people’s 
lives.100 Furthermore, this policy area still entails a high level of poten-
tial political risks,101 with the current refugee crisis being an illustration. 
Therefore, the issue of public support is a fundamental necessity.102 With 
the close link between public support, democratic legitimacy and the is-
sue of accountability,103 the EP’s involvement in the CFSP formation pro-
cess looks expedient if the EU actions are to be accepted and supported 
by the citizens.104   
In the wider context, elitism, over-bureaucracy, complexity and the 
inability to communicate results continue to be evident features of the 
European integration process in the public view.105 Against the back-
ground of Europeans losing their trust in the EU project, there is a grow-
ing need for the EP to enhance its role in regard to the CFSP with its 
‘double democratic deficit’ problem and ‘rubber-stamping by politicians’ 
pattern of making decisions. Thus, from the theoretical perspective, the 
parliamentarisation of the CFSP is a rational process as it refers to argu-
ments from the ‘input legitimacy’ debate. Therefore, it is able to enhance 
96 Mittag and Wessels (n 57) 17.
97 Specifically stressing international trade, aid and development policies.
98 D Viola, European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament in the 1990s: An Investiga-
tion into the Role and Voting Behaviour of the European Parliament’s Political Groups (Ash-
gate 2000) 177.
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Worldwide Interdependence (Transaction 2011) 155. 
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this policy area by embedding this theoretical background into the foun-
dations of the political processes within the CFSP. By doing so, parlia-
mentarisation will reinforce the internal political stability of the Union 
and place the EU into a wider pan-European political context.
5 From theoretical to practical reasoning 
In addition to the theoretical reasoning delineated above, CFSP par-
liamentarisation has a number of practical benefits. This section sub-
mits that the formal connection of public political debate in the EP to 
the CFSP formation process will enhance its consistency, effectiveness 
and transparency, simultaneously contributing to the formation of genu-
inely common European policy, thus altering the current national-based 
mode. To some extent, this debate is a continuation of the legitimacy dis-
course, albeit from the perspective of ‘output’ legitimacy, which is associ-
ated mainly with institutional performance as well as with the success of 
particular policies.
The current CFSP rules do not prevent the EP from hearing any in-
ternational topic due to the general ‘power of debate’ – something that the 
EP has been constantly doing since the famous case of the Spain Asso-
ciation Agreement of 1962. The most recent example of the continuation 
of this practice is the Ukrainian crisis, with the EP closely following the 
development of the situation.106 Thus, the EP has been instinctively doing 
something that is considered to be the major task of every parliamentary 
institution – debating policies. In this sense, the EP has developed an 
impressive arsenal of instruments, including both ‘rhetorical actions’107 
and traditional parliamentary tools. In particular, Stavridis has listed the 
following: foreign policy debates, declarations, reports and other rhetori-
cal statements, hearings as well as resolutions and policy recommenda-
tions.108 This list can be extended to include rapporteurs, committees, 
(special) commissions of inquiry, oral and written questions109 and finan-
cial/budgetary control.110 
However, the current ‘special’ CFSP rules formally exclude the EP 
both from the policy formation process and from participation in the con-
106 From December 2013 until January 2015, the EP adopted 9 special resolutions on 
Ukraine.
107 F Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’ (2001) 55(1) International Organization 48.
108 S Stavridis, ‘The CFSP/ESDP, Parliamentary Accountability, and the “Future of Europe” 
Convention debate’ (2003) Working Paper no 42, Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus 3.
109 Mittag and Wessels (n 57) 25.
110 C Gusy, ‘Parliaments and the Executive: Old Control Rights and New Control Contexts 
in German’ in Katja S Ziegler, Dennis Baranger and AW Bradley (eds), Constitutionalism and 
the Role of Parliaments (Hart Publishing 2007) 132. 
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clusion of international agreements within this policy area. It is easier 
to begin with the latter as there is no valid argument for this status quo, 
except for the position of Member States, which are reluctant to create 
a powerful Brussels-based decision-making forum for foreign policy.111 
However, reference to the ‘sovereignty symbols’ is not appropriate as it 
has been undermined by supranational integration in other ‘symbolic’ 
areas.112 Against the background of the EP’s wide involvement in negotia-
tions of international agreements in adjoining areas of foreign policy, the 
traditional arguments of the special nature of the CFSP is not really con-
vincing. On the other hand, the benefits of the formal inclusion of the EP 
into the treaty-making procedure are similar to those for its participation 
in the policy formation process.
This section focuses on the potential benefits that parliamentarisa-
tion can bring to the CFSP and it provides three major practical argu-
ments to support the idea for the EP’s participation in the CFSP forma-
tion process, including its participation in the conclusion of international 
agreements. First, the EP is the only institution capable of being the 
forum for shaping common European policies, ensuring discussion of 
the entire spectrum of existing options and opinions. Further, the inter-
connection between parliamentary debate and policy formation has tra-
ditionally been viewed as a cornerstone of the process.113 Second, public 
debate in the EP is the only transparent way to set the CFSP priorities for 
the limited resources available.114 Third, parliamentary participation will 
ensure consistency of policies as well as control over the transformation 
of the treaty-based Union values to specific policies, thus ensuring the 
recognisability of EU foreign policy. 
From the 1970s, the EP was increasingly operating as a parlia-
mentary institution with the major objective of providing ‘an arena in 
which every opinion can produce itself in full light to be tested in ad-
verse controversy’.115 As a result of the enhancement of the EP’s role in 
the EU institutional system, its function as a potential forum for debate 
and the launching of initiatives was emphasised,116 often with further 
111 J Howorth, ‘European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hang-
ing Together or Separately?’ (2001) 39(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 765.
112 N Klein and W Wessels, ‘CFSP Progress or Decline after Lisbon?’ (2013) 18(4) European 
Foreign Affairs Review 449, 466.
113 N Witzleb, A Martínez, and P. Winand (eds), The European Union and Global Engagement 
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114 J March and J Olsen, Democratic Governance (Free Press 1995).  
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ernment (first published 1861, Dent 1972) 239–240.
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connection to the phenomenon of elite socialisation.117 Today, the provi-
sion of a ‘grand forum’ for the discussion of foreign policy is considered 
to be among the EP’s principal functions.118 There is obviously a match 
between the pressing necessity of having political debate within a high-
ly politicised area, which the CFSP is,119 and the traditional function of 
parliaments, which is to ensure that policies are discussed publicly and 
that reasons for the decision are provided to the public.120 In the EU, the 
necessity for debate over foreign policy is even higher than in a state, 
as, in addition to traditional general reasoning, the EU has three unique 
reasons of its own.
The common general reasons for such debate are rather straightfor-
ward and are based on the rationale of exposing and discussing diverse 
views on strategic direction and policy priorities, thus diminishing poten-
tial risks for erroneous decisions.121 Further, public parliamentary debate 
ensures discussion of the entire spectrum of available solutions. Specific 
EU reasons include: the need for CFSP compliance with declared values 
and principles, the need for the formation of all-European common ap-
proaches and the need to ensure the synergy of the CFSP with other are-
as of foreign policy. None of these tasks can realistically be achieved with 
the EP remaining formally excluded from the policy formation process.
The initial question for foreign policy formation implies the deter-
mination of values and identities it is intended to defend.122 In the case 
of the EU, these values are stipulated in the founding treaties,123 thus 
enjoying the highest normative power. However, the transformation of 
those values and principles into specific policies implies a certain degree 
of control over the policy-making process. This article supports the argu-
ment for the importance of public control over any exercise of political 
power in the context of collective choices of values.124 In this context, 
parliamentary procedures imply a higher level of scrutiny to secure the 
compliance of policies with the declared values. Furthermore, the EP’s 
established reputation as ‘the champion of European values’125 is a politi-
cal guarantee for its value-based debate. 
117 C Strøby-Jensen, ‘Neo-functionalism’ in Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (n 66) 75-77.
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Against the divergence among the Member States on foreign policy 
issues, the need for the formation of shared aims is another fundamen-
tal challenge for the EU. Scholars stress the initial steps in the slow and 
painful process of their generation.126 From this perspective, the exist-
ence of a ‘grand forum’ for the search for and debate on such common 
grounds is vital. Moreover, the formal connection of parliamentary debate 
to policy formation is likely to foster the process, as this will alter its 
mode from its current intergovernmental setting. Thus, decisions must 
be based on common European interests, implying that these interests 
have been previously identified, debated and consolidated. In this sense, 
the EP’s role in consensus building is supported by the legitimacy argu-
ment. In turn, the consensus building process can be a solid basis for 
long-term strategic guidelines, which are necessary to enhance the con-
sistency of EU foreign policy. 
Perhaps, the last point to make is the need for ‘”cross-pillar” 
interactions’,127 or the development of synergy between the CFSP and 
other segments of foreign policy. Here, the EP is also in a unique position 
as it is already a part of the policy formation process for trade, aid and 
development. Moreover, for decades it has been playing a significant role 
in terms of democratisation and human rights protection. Thus, the EP’s 
exclusion from the CFSP process remains illogical. In academic debate 
the idea of ‘upgrading’ the EP’s role to that of an active participant in the 
CFSP decision-making process has already been discussed as being ‘the 
simplest option to reduce the inconsistency of the Union’s institutional 
design’.128 From the institutional perspective, the establishment of parity 
for the EP’s competences throughout all foreign policy areas will result 
in practical rationality benefits, including the unification of rules and 
procedures, as well as the simplification and harmonisation of the EU 
institutional system, leading to the reduction of transaction costs, which 
is often identified as a factor of institutional development.129 
6 Scrutinising the EU executives
Parliamentary control over policy implementation is the last (but not 
the least) stage of the political cycle in terms of democratic accountabili-
ty.130 In this sense, the EP’s role can hardly be over-estimated in terms 
126 U Guérot, ‘Germany Goes Global: Farewell Europe’ (European Council on Foreign Re-
lations, 16 September 2010) <http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_germany_goes_
global/> accessed 30 December 2016. 
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of making EU executives provide sufficient information and justify their 
actions.131 It is necessary to stress that post-Lisbon practice has made 
considerable progress along this path, ensuring the EP’s involvement to 
a much greater degree than the founding treaties stipulated. However, in 
order to develop into a stable functioning system, these practices require 
formalisation with a further connection to the EP’s formal competence to 
sanction executives. 
It should be noted that EU informal practices have traditionally 
aimed at diminishing tension and inter-organisational conflicts.132 They 
are based on, rather than constrained by, the founding treaties and usu-
ally go much further than treaty-based limits. Their scope includes inter-
institutional agreements,133 informal commitments and numerous writ-
ten and unwritten rules. In this way, the post-Lisbon inter-institutional 
dynamics strengthened the influence of the EP, which enhanced its scru-
tinising position regarding all three major elements of the post-Lisbon 
system of the CFSP – the HR, the EEAS and the Union’s delegations.134 
The EP’s relations with the HR are now based on the new Inter-
Institutional agreement of 2013135 and traditional informal commitments 
practice. Moreover, the practice of inauguration Commission commit-
ments was extended to the HR.136 Together with a number of other simi-
lar documents,137 these commitments ensured substantially deeper EP 
cooperation with the HR than the Lisbon Treaty required. Furthermore, 
the HR volunteered for ‘special relations’ with the EP, emphasising its 
democratic legitimacy, and understanding the importance of parliamen-
tary accountability.138 
To some extent, the HR was driven by institutional reasons aiming at 
enhancing her current uncertain position.139 In this sense, the article re-
131 D Curtin, P Mair and Y Papadopoulos. ‘Positioning Accountability in European Govern-
ance: An Introduction’. (2010) 33(5) West European Politics 929, 937
132 J Stacey, Integrating Europe: Informal Politics and Institutional Change (OUP 2010) 68.
133 О Moskalenko, ‘Role of Inter-institutional Agreements in the Rise of European Parlia-
ment Competences External Relations’ (2014) 67(1) Studia Diplomatica – Brussels Journal 
of International Relations 15. 
134 S Duke, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations’ (2008) 1 Eipascope 13 <www.eipa.
eu> accessed 30 December 2016.
135 See n 33.
136 Hearing with Baroness Ashton at the Committee on Foreign Affairs (6 January 2010). 
Parliament hearing of Mrs. Mogherini (6 October 2014).
137 High Representative Declaration on Political Accountability (8 July 2010); High Repre-
sentative Statement on the basic organization of the EEAS central administration (8 July 
2010).
138 K Raube, ‘The Emerging Relationship between the European Parliament, the High Rep-
resentative and the External Action Service’ (2011) Working Paper No 74, 9 <https://ghum.
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fers to the institutional approach, using its argument of maximisation of 
one’s own self-interests and preferences,140 as CFSP parliamentarisation 
has the potential to reinforce the HR’s institutional role at the implemen-
tation level,141 since reference to policies and programmes legitimated by 
the EP’s participation will certainly add to the political weight of his/
her actions. Thus, the HR’s status of primus inter pares in his/her rela-
tions with the ‘Group of External Relations Commissioners’ will acquire a 
different meaning, as the implementation process would imply common 
responsibility instead of the current dependence of the HR on the com-
missioners involved.142
In its relations with the EEAS, which is often viewed as the cor-
nerstone of the post-Lisbon architecture of external relations,143 the EP 
used its budgetary leverage to ensure the accountability of the service. It 
managed to establish a structured relationship with the EEAS in terms 
of political control, supervision and budgetary oversight.144 Furthermore, 
the EP strengthened its influence after the EEAS reform of 2013,145 thus 
going much further than the Treaties suggested.146  
The EP also made some steps towards ensuring its scrutiny over 
the EU delegations. As the US experience shows, diplomatic personnel 
can be held directly accountable; however, the Lisbon Treaty has not 
provided for any special procedure in this sense.147 Nonetheless, the EP 
developed a rule to have heads of the delegations appear before the EP 
prior to the start of their mission.148 This unofficial rule was formalised 
by the Rules of Procedure,149 often seen as a specific channel to reinforce 
the EP’s competences for CFSP matters.150 However, the attempt to de-
velop this practice into full-scale US Congress-style hearings failed.151 
Frequently, reference is made to the EP’s lack of formal competence to 
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block the appointment of a head of a delegation.152 Nonetheless, in this 
case political consequences may suffice as it will be rather embarrassing 
to have somebody leading an EU delegation after a negative opinion from 
the EP. 
In addition to the special mechanisms mentioned above, the EP can 
certainly use its traditional instruments of scrutiny, such as special com-
mittees, rapporteurs and questions, as well as special hearings, work-
shops, ad hoc missions, etc,153 which already place the EP in a strong po-
sition in terms of scrutinising CFSP executives. Against the background 
of the well-developed informal but rather efficient system of EP scrutiny 
over all CFSP major segments, the question is why these practices need 
formalisation. In general terms, the ‘power to sanction’ has traditionally 
been part of parliamentary control,154 thus making national parliaments 
decisive actors in co-determining final policy outputs.155 From a more 
practical perspective, there are two basic answers to this question. The 
first is the fact that the EP should not expect too much from ‘informal 
and indirect power’.156 This submission echoes the claim for strengthen-
ing the EP’s formal rather than informal rights, as expressed in a number 
of previous studies.157 The practical rationale of this argument lies in the 
need to establish a systematic and institutionalised structure of interac-
tion, which requires the EP’s right ‘to be heard’ to be assured, as this 
right is of vital importance for the effectiveness of parliamentary supervi-
sion.158 Thus, the establishment of a stable basis requires its formalisa-
tion by legal means. 
The second argument stresses the importance of formal leverage in 
the EP’s relations with the EU executives. With reference to the experi-
ence of the EP’s consent right for international agreements, it is neces-
sary to stress that after two landmark ‘no-consent’ votes,159 the EP used 
this leverage to guarantee a sufficient level of cooperation throughout 
the negotiation process instead of following the traditional parliamentary 
voting pattern. In other words, the formal leverage of possible sanctions 
would foster the development of mutually acceptable inter-institutional 
practices without limiting the scope of parliamentary scrutiny.
152 Raube (n 138) 6. 
153 Bajtay (n 15) 31.
154 C Caballero-Bourdot, ‘Inter-parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP: Avenues for the Future 
(2011) Occasional Paper, no 94, Institute for Security Studies, 13.
155 Wouters and Raube (n 1) 4.
156 Lalone (n 69) 14.
157 Mittag and Wessels (n 57) 25.
158 Raube (n 138) 4. 
159 The Cases of the EU-USA SWIFT Bank Data Transfer Agreement (SWIFT) and the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).
273CYELP 12 [2016] 251-273
7 Conclusions
Post-Lisbon practice has revealed that the limited format of the EP’s 
involvement constrains the development of the CFSP. Furthermore, the 
current formal intergovernmental set-up for the CFSP is often recognised 
as an obstacle in the way of synergy within EU foreign policy. Against 
the background of the current problematic development of EU external 
relations, the paper has studied the idea of the parliamentarisation of 
the CFSP from different perspectives. Although the reasoning differs, the 
conclusions are identical – parliamentarisation of this policy area is a 
rational choice, providing a practical and comprehensive solution to a 
number of diverse problems currently existing for EU external relations. 
From a theoretical perspective, this process successfully meets the 
need for more democracy for the EU, both in a wider context and with-
in the specific area of foreign policy (input legitimacy). In the practical 
sense, it will ensure a forum for public policy debate, thus enhancing the 
transparency, coherence and effectiveness of the policy formation pro-
cess (output legitimacy). Separately, one should stress the potential of 
parliamentarisation for meeting specific EU needs, which are: the forma-
tion of a genuinely common European CFSP, a value-based policy for-
mation process, and the development of synergy between the CFSP and 
other areas of foreign policy. 
The increased level of parliamentary scrutiny over the implementa-
tion stage will ensure an enhanced level of EU executives’ accountabil-
ity through instruments of parliamentary control. From the institutional 
perspective, CFSP parliamentarisation will contribute to the harmonisa-
tion of the EU institutional system through the unification of the EP’s 
status and competences throughout all areas of foreign policy and by 
reinforcing the HR’s currently uncertain status in terms of the policy im-
plementation process.
